

RAC

Engineers & Economists

2nd International Week on Risk Analysis
as Applied to Dam Safety and Dam Security

Theoretical-Practical Course

Universidad Politécnica de Valencia

Valencia, Spain

27 & 28 February 2008

Utah State
UNIVERSITY

IDSRM

Complete Dam Risk Analysis & Detailed Applications:

L.6 - Hills Creek Dam Risk

Assessment:


**Evaluation of Flood Risk Reduction Alternatives
& Uncertainty Analysis**

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Institute for Dam Safety Risk Management - Utah State University
and RAC Engineers & Economists

Outline

- 1) Engineering Assessment
- 2) Event Trees & Loadings
- 3) Consequences Inputs and Breach-
Inundation Analyses
- 4) RA Results - Existing Dam
- 5) RA Results – Risk Reduction Alternatives
- 6) Uncertainty Analysis
- 7) Conclusions & Recommendations




1) Engineering Assessment



			Assessment Factor	Rating	Assessment Factor	Rating
			<h2>Engineering Assessment</h2>	FLOOD		EARTHQUAKE
Concrete Gravity Section		Concrete Gravity Section				
External stability	N/A	External stability		N/A		
Internal stability	N/A	Internal stability		N/A		
Foundation Piping	N/A	Reservoir				
Abutment Foundation Stability (Dam Structure)	N/A	Stability		P		
Overall flood capacity		Loss Of Capacity		P		
PMF	ANP	Mining		N/A		
Overtopping	ANP	Spillway and stilling basin system				
Spillway and stilling basin system		Structural Stability		P		
Structural Stability	P	Gates - structural capacity		P		
Hydraulic capacity	ANP	Gate piers - structural capacity		P		
Walls - overtopping	ANP	Appurtenances				
Gates - structural capacity	AP	Outlet works		P		
Gate piers - structural capacity	P	Embankment				
Erodibility	ANP	Liquefaction		AP		
Mechanical Systems	AP	Stability (includes excessive deformation)		AP		
Electrical Systems	P	Foundation				
Obstructions		Liquefaction		AP		
Drift and Debris	ANP	Stability		AP		
Failed Slopes	P	Fault movement		P		
Sill	P	Instrumentation		P		
Outlet Works		NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS				
Piping	N/A	Concrete Gravity Section				
Electrical Systems	AP	Foundation sliding		N/A		
Mechanical Systems	P	Foundation piping		N/A		
Stability		Stresses within dam body		N/A		
Intake	P	Reservoir				
Tunnel/Conduit	P	Reservoir rim stability		P		
Obstructions	P	Appurtenances				
Embankment		Outlet works piping		P		
Geotech		Outlet works gates		P		
Piping	P	Embankment				
Stability	P	Piping		P		
Toe erosion	ANP	Slope stability		P		
Surface Erosion	P	Foundation				
Wave action	P	Piping		P		
Abutments	P	Stability		P		
Foundation Piping	P	Erodibility		P		
Reservoir Rim		Mines		N/A		
Stability	P	Instrumentation		P		
Loss Of Capacity	P	Deterioration of Materials		P		
Erodibility	P					
Mines	N/A					
Instrumentation						



Ratings	No.	%
Number of P:	35	71%
Number of ANP:	7	14%
Number of (ANP):	7	14%
Number of (NP):	0	0%
Number of NP:	0	0%
Number of (NP):	0	0%
Number of N/A:	12	
Total:	61	
Number of ANP+ NP:	7	14%
Number of (ANP) + (NP):	0	0%




2) Event Trees & Loadings










Per demand reliabilities


- Single gate
 - 1 in 10: Preliminary fault tree estimate
 - 1 in 50: Used to allow for repairs (1 in 100 – 1 in 10)
 - 1 in 200: After Indicative Gate Reliability Fix (1 in 1,000 – 1 in 100)
- All gates – Common Cause
 - 1 in 100: Preliminary fault tree estimate
 - 1 in 50: Used to allow for repairs (1 in 100 – 1 in 10)
 - 1 in 200: After Indicative Gate Reliability Fix (1 in 1,000 – 1 in 100)

PEAK STAGE – AEP: Existing Dam & 5 ft Raise





Earthquake Event Tree


- Embankment Failure Modes
 - Liquefaction
 - Sudden Overtopping
 - Delayed Seepage Erosion Through Cracks (SEC)
 - Intervention?
- Consequences
 - Life loss
 - Economic damages




Legend
○ Expanded Chance




Earthquake Loading



3) Consequences Inputs and Breach-Inundation Analyses



Consequence Areas



Summary of Economic Damages - Flood Overtopping Failure & No Failure		
Failure/No Failure - Reservoir Level (No. gates failed)	Higher Projection (\$M)	Lower Projection (\$M)
DCF(0) - 1548	61,615	47,649
DCF(0)nf	59,796	46,359
DCF(1) - 1548	90,063	69,087
DCF(1)nf	56,810	44,065
DCF(2) - 1548	84,547	64,889
DCF(2)nf	4,501	4,500
DCF(3) - 1548	75,186	57,693
DCF(3)nf	3,034	3,033

Summary of Economic Damages - Flood, Normal Operating & Earthquake Failure Modes		
Failure Mode – Reservoir level	Higher Projection (\$M)	Lower Projection (\$M)
Toe Erosion - 1543	76,368	58,598
Piping - 1543	72,890	55,876
Slope Stability - 1543	74,447	57,029
EQ(1) - 1541	72,704	55,725
EQ(2) - 1500	47,401	36,710
EQ(3) - 1450	35	28
EQ(4) - 1425	27	21


Warning time		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Warning time = Travel time +/- Warning Time Adjustment Adjustment Time depends on failure timing-detection-decision-notification-warning conditions - estimated by Engineering Team 		
Hills Creek Warning Time Adjustments		
Event case	Day Exposure	Night Exposure
Dam Crest Flood	> 200 minutes	> 200 minutes
Earthquake	-30 to -120 minutes	-30 to -120 minutes
Normal Operating Condition	0 to 120 minutes	-30 to -120 minutes

Life Loss Estimates – Graham Method
Flood Overtopping Failure & No Failure

Failure/No Failure Event	Best Estimate	Lower Estimate	Higher Estimate
DCF(0)	2,229	370	4,457
DCF(0)nf	2,188	363	4,376
DCF(1)	3,100	516	6,201
DCF(1)nf	2,115	351	4,230
DCF(2)	3,039	506	6,077
DCF(2)nf	215	35	430
DCF(3)	2,667	444	5,334
DCF(3)nf	186	31	372

Life Loss Estimates – Graham Method
Piping, Slope Stability and Earthquake Failures

Event (WT Adjustment)	Best Estimate	Event Case (WT Adjustment)	Best Estimate
TOE EROSION	2,843	SLOPE ST.: -120 NIGHT	2,954
PIPING: 0 DAY	2,577	EQ(1): -30 DAY OR NIGHT	2,595
PIPING: 120 DAY	2,576	EQ(1): -120 DAY OR NIGHT	2,886
PIPING: -30 NIGHT	2,605	EQ(2): -30 DAY OR NIGHT	1,806
PIPING: -120 NIGHT	2,907	EQ(2): -120 DAY OR NIGHT	2,047
SLOPE ST.: 0 DAY	2,624	EQ(3): -30 DAY OR NIGHT	247
SLOPE ST.: 120 DAY	2,623	EQ(3): -120 DAY OR NIGHT	492
SLOPE ST.: -30 NIGHT	2,650	PIPING: -120-NIGHT REC. SEASON	2,939



4) Risk Assessment Results - Existing Dam


Existing Dam Results

USBR APF
USBR ALL

	(a) Probability of failure		(b) Incremental risk cost		(c) Risk Reduction benefit		(d) Risk Reduction cost		(e) Total economic cost		(f) Benefit: Cost		(g) Annualized Incremental life loss	
	(/yr)	%	(\$/yr)	%	(\$/yr)	(\$/yr)	(\$/yr)	(\$/yr)	(\$/yr)	(-)	(lives/yr)	%		
E-B: Existing - Base Case														
Flood	9.4E-06	27%	\$ 317,612	20%					\$ 317,612			0.012	18%	
Earthquake	1.6E-05	47%	\$ 646,653	41%					\$ 646,653			0.030	45%	
Normal Operating	9.3E-06	26%	\$ 605,469	39%					\$ 605,469			0.025	37%	
Total	3.5E-05	100%	\$ 1,569,733	100%					\$ 1,569,733			0.067	100%	


(j) Incremental Damages		(k) Incremental Life Loss		(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)
Minimum (\$M)	Maximum (\$M)	Minimum (lives)	Maximum (lives)			No Failure Flood Ann. Damages (\$/yr)	Reduction in Flood Benefits (\$/yr)	No Failure Flood Ann. Life Loss (lives/yr)	Reduction in Flood Benefits (lives/yr)
222	75,476		4		2,893	\$ 3,897,565			0.210
24	64,755		345		2,789				
64,383	65,738		2,577		2,829				
						\$ 3,897,565			0.210

Existing
Dam Hills
Creek
Dam
ANCOLD
(2003)
Societal
Risk
Guideline
(F-N)



Existing Dam – Risk Evaluation

- **USBR ALL**
 - Flood > 0.01 lives/yr
 - EQ > 0.01 lives/yr
 - NOC > 0.01 lives/yr
- **USBR APF/ HSE & ANCOLD Individual**
< 1 in 10,000 /yr
- **ANCOLD Societal**
above F-N limit line
- **HSE Societal** < 1 in 5,000 for > 50 lives




Observations on Existing Dam


- Does not meet Corps flood requirements (Engineering Assessment - ANPs)
- “Apparently” meets all other Corps Earthquake and Normal Operating requirements for dam safety
 - Investigations needed (ANP, AP ratings)
- Probability of failure not high, but not low
 - Needs to be considered in context of consequences
- Potential life loss is large
 - Non-structural opportunities for risk reduction?
- Potential economic consequences are large
- “Apparently” meets
 - USBR APF/ANCOLD Individual Risk/HSE Individual Risk Guidelines: *Combination of all initiating events*
 - HSE Societal Risk Guideline: *Combination of all initiating events*
- “Apparently” does not meet
 - USBR ALL Guideline: Flood, Earthquake & Normal Operating
 - ANCOLD Societal Risk Guidelines: *Combination of all initiating events*
- Before Existing Dam RA is used for “sign off” decision making investigations needed to:
 - test failure modes, improve strength parameter estimates, conduct in-depth analyses, etc.




Benefit/Cost Ratios



ALARP Strength of Justification Ratings for Fixes




HSE Tolerability of Risk





Debris boom and Indicative gate reliability

Risk Reduction vs. Annualized Cost



Fix Description	Annualized Cost of Risk Reduction
INDIVIDUAL FIXES - SCUPs	
E.B: Existing - Base Case	\$ -
BIToe: Toe channel	\$ 157,148
BIDebris: Debris boom	\$ 5,301
BIGate: Gate reliability	\$ 83,435
BIRaise: Raise	\$ 72,635
BIWiden: Widen Spillway	\$ 1,038,079
BIRCC280: RCC Spillway 280ft & Raise	\$ 1,497,623
BIRCC455: RCC Spillway 455ft & Raise	\$ 2,274,296
COMPLETE PMF FIXES:	
BCWiden: Widen Spillway Complete Fix	\$ 1,356,598
BCRCC280: RCC Spillway 280ft & Raise Complete Fix	\$ 1,743,507
BCRCC455: RCC Spillway 455ft & Raise Complete Fix	\$ 2,436,745



6) Uncertainty Analysis


- Intrinsic to RA and TA (SBA)
- In RA “best estimates” plus sensitivity analysis
- Limited examples of uncertainty analysis
 - USBR uses for more detailed RAs
 - Corps draft Tolerable Risk guidelines depend on Uncertainty Analysis

Uncertainty


- Intrinsic to RA and TA (SBA)
- In RA “best estimates” plus sensitivity analysis
- Limited examples of uncertainty analysis
 - USBR uses for more detailed RAs
 - Corps draft Tolerable Risk guidelines depend on Uncertainty Analysis

Best Estimate Inputs do not in general lead to Best Estimate Outputs


RA Inputs



Uncertainty input distribution on flood loading - peak reservoir stage



Uncertainty input distribution on earthquake loading - PGA



Uncertainty associated with: performance of various components of dam under flood, and earthquake loading, and under static condition, etc.


System Responses

Risk Analysis Model

Consequences

Uncertainty associated with: breach parameters, breach flow (depth, velocity), inundation mapping, warning times, damages, life loss computations, efficiency of evacuation system, etc.

Uncertainty input distribution on flood overtopping failure SRP



Uncertainty associated with: performance of various components of dam under flood, and earthquake loading, and under static condition, etc.


System Responses

Risk Analysis Model

Consequences

Uncertainty associated with: breach parameters, breach flow (depth, velocity), inundation mapping, warning times, damages, life loss computations, efficiency of evacuation system, etc.

RA Inputs - Uncertainty input distribution on dam failure life loss



Uncertainty associated with: performance of various components of dam under flood, and earthquake loading, and under static condition, etc.

System Responses

Risk Analysis Model

Consequences

Uncertainty associated with: breach parameters, breach flow (depth, velocity), inundation mapping, warning times, damages, life loss computations, efficiency of evacuation system, etc.

EXISTING DAM


- Deterministic (Best Est Inputs) 3.5×10^{-5} /yr
- 25th percentile
- Mean 7×10^{-5} /yr

USBR APF (Tier 2)

- Tot. Prob. Fail. 1×10^{-4} /yr

S/W FIXES

- Widen
- RCC




EXISTING DAM

- Deterministic (Best Est Inputs) 1.2×10^{-2} /yr
- 20% confid. 1×10^{-2}
- <1% confid. 1×10^{-3}

USBR ALL (Tier 1) - Flood
 - Inc. Ann Life Loss
 1×10^{-2} & 1×10^{-3} lives/yr

S/W FIXES

- Widen: 4th gate
- 70% & 10% confid
- **RCC**
- 97% & 70% confid



DETERMINISTIC

- Existing Dam & S/W Fixes



Do not meet

UNCERTAINTY

E.g. 50 lives

- Existing: 5% confid meets
- Widen S/W (4th gate): 20% confid meets
- **RCC S/W: 35% confid meets**

ANCOLD Societal Risk (for Existing Dams)




DETERMINISTIC

- Widen S/W (4th gate):
 - US\$143M
 - Moderate/Poor
 - 80th percentile
- RCC S/W:
 - US\$120M
 - Moderate
 - 75th percentile

UNCERTAINTY

- Widen & RCC S/W:
 - V. Strong: 30% confid
 - Strong: 20% confid
 - Moderate: 30% confid
 - Poor: 20% confid

**ALARP Justification
- Adjusted CSLS**




DETERMINISTIC

- Widen S/W (4th gate):
 - R = 24
- RCC S/W:
 - R = 20
- HSE guidelines would not justify risk reduction

UNCERTAINTY

- Widen & RCC S/W
 - 30% confid. that HSE guidelines would justify risk reduction
- Mean R:
 - Widen S/W (4th gate):
 - R = 25
 - RCC S/W:
 - R = 23

**Disproportionality Ratio Justification
(UK HSE)**



Widen S/W

RCC S/W

Some thoughts on Uncertainty Analysis


- Best Estimate Inputs do not in general lead to Best Estimate Outputs
- Confidence in meeting Tolerable Risk Guidelines
 - Valuable insights into reality of uncertainty
 - Adds to challenge of interpretation and understanding
 - Corps of Engineers draft Tolerable Risk guidelines based on confidence
- Guidelines for consistent uncertainty analysis
- USBR using in detailed RAs

7) Conclusion & Recommendations




Observations on Risk Reduction Alternatives


- Flood alternatives:
 - Potential for risk increases
 - Flood “disbenefits”
 - Raise leads to increase in toe erosion probability
 - Strength of risk-based justification:
 - ALARP strength of justification: very high – poor for individual SCUPs
 - B/C > 1.0: Debris boom (1.4) and Indicative gate reliability (2.7)
 - *HSE Disproportionality justifies Debris boom and Indicative gate reliability*
- Residual Risk Evaluation
 - Only RCC spillway “appears” to meet USBR ALL Guideline
 - Earthquake and Normal Operating “appear” not to meet USBR ALL
- Where to go from here?
 - 1) Investigations (ANP, AP ratings)
 - 2) What structural OPTIONS to consider in ALARP evaluation for Flood, EQ & NOC?
 - 3) What non-structural OPTIONS to consider in ALARP evaluation for Flood, EQ & NOC?



Engineering Assessment – EA
(TA – Traditional Approach to Reservoir Safety)



Risk Assessment – RA
(Tolerable Risk Guidelines - Indicative)



Engineering & Risk Assessments – EA (TA) & RA

		Risk Assessment Outcome ^{a)}			
		- Risk Justification For:			
		No Fix	Further Investigation	Long Term Fix	Short and Long Term Fix
Engineering Assessment Outcome	Pass (P)	No Fix - EA & RA	↔ ?	Fix - RA	Fix - EA
	Apparent Pass (AP)	↕ ?			
	Apparent No Pass (ANP)	↕ ?			
	No Pass (NP)	Fix - EA			

Engineering & Risk Assessment – EA (TA) & RA

		Risk Assessment Outcome ^{a)}			
		- Risk Justification For:			
		No Fix	Further Investigation	Long Term Fix	Short and Long Term Fix
Engineering Assessment Outcome	Pass (P)	No Fix - EA & RA	↔ ?	Fix - RA only	Fix - EA only
	Apparent Pass (AP)	↕ ?	↔ ?	↕ ?	↕ ?
	Apparent No Pass (ANP)	↕ ?	↔ ?	↕ ?	↕ ?
	No Pass (NP)	Fix - EA only	↔ ?	Fix - EA & RA	Fix - EA & RA

Remedial measures

Investigations

Gates & Debris

Flood - PMF

EQ & NOC

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Home Page

(including links to selected papers):

<http://www.engineering.usu.edu/undergraduate/faculty/bowles.html>